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On the origin of constraints 
 
Sander Lestrade, Geertje van Bergen, and Peter de Swart 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter addresses two debates central to Optimality Theory. The first concerns the 
nature of constraints (cf. Tesar and Smolensky 2000; Boersma and Hayes 2001; Jäger 2003, 
2007). According to one position, the set of constraints is innate and only their ranking has to 
be determined by the learning child; the other position has it that the set of constraints is 
functionally motivated and developed by generalizing over input data. The second debate 
pertains to the nature of the optimization process (Blutner 2000; Blutner et al. 2006). Again 
two hypotheses can broadly be distinguished. Some argue that the process is unidirectional, 
going from form to meaning or from meaning to form; according to others the process is 
bidirectional, going from meaning to form and back again. In this chapter, we will link the 
two discussions (cf. also Blutner 2007; Zeevat and Jäger 2002). We will argue that specific 
unidirectional constraints can be derived from bidirectional optimization processes and are 
thus functionally motivated (i.e., following from the use of language). To prevent this from 
being an abstract exercise only, we will show how this would work for differential case 
marking (DCM).  
We will first give a brief introduction to DCM. Next, we will discuss the differences 
between unidirectional and bidirectional optimization procedures. Finally, we will show how 
unidirectional constraints can be derived from generalizing over bidirectional optimization 
processes. 
 
8.2  Differential case marking 
 
In many languages, case marking is used only selectively; for example, case marking of a 
verb’s arguments may depend on their animacy values. If the differential use of case concerns 
the marking of a transitive object, this is called differential object marking (DOM).1 For 
example, in Malayalam, all and only animate objects are obligatorily marked, as can be seen 
in (1). 
 
Malayalam (Dravidian, India; Asher and Kumari 1997: 203) 
 
(1)  a.  Avan  oru paʃuvin-e  vaɲɲi. 
he a cow-ACC buy.PAST 
																																																								
1 We will restrict our analysis to the differential marking of objects, although everything we say should similarly 
hold for differential subject marking (DSM) too. For a more elaborate introduction into differential case marking, 
cf. Aissen (2003); de Swart (2007); for a more general discussion on case alternations, cf. Lestrade (2013). 
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‘He bought a cow.’ 
b.  ɲaan teeɲɲa  vaɲɲi. 
I  coconut  buy.PAST 
‘I bought a coconut.’ 
 
If case marking is dependent on properties of a single argument only, as in example (1), this 
is called local DCM. Local DCM contrasts with global DCM, in which case marking is 
dependent on properties of both arguments. For example, in Awtuw, if two unmarked NPs 
are present, then the one higher in animacy is interpreted as the transitive subject (in which 
Human > Animate > Inanimate). Equal animacy results in an interpretation with a conjoined 
subject, as the contrast between (2a) and (2b) shows. 
 
Awtuw (Papuan, Papua New Guinea; Feldman 1986: 110) 
 
(2)  a.  Tey  tale  yaw  dæl-i.   
3.F.SG  woman  pig  FAC-bite-PAST 
‘The woman bit the pig.’ not: ‘The pig bit the woman.’ 
 
b.  Piyren  yaw  di-kæl-iy. 
dog  pig  FAC-IMP-bite-IMP 
‘The dog and the pig bite.’ not: ‘The dog is biting the pig/The pig is biting the 
dog.’ 
 
An object marker can be used to overrule this interpretational preference. Accusative case is 
obligatory when the object (O) equals or is higher than the transitive subject (A) in the 
Animacy Hierarchy.2 This is illustrated in the following examples (Feldman 1986: 110): 
 
(3)  a.  Tey  tale-re  yaw  dæl-i. 
3.F.SG woman-ACC pig  FAC.bite-PAST 
‘The pig bit the woman.’ 
 
b.  Piyren-re  yaw  di-k-æl-iy. 
dog-ACC pig  FAC-IMP-bite-IMP 
‘The pig is biting the dog.’ 
 
																																																								
2	We	follow	conventions	in	the	functional‐typological	literature	and	use	A	for	the	agent	(subject)	of	a	
transitive	clause,	O	for	the	patient	(object)	of	a	transitive	clause,	and	S	for	the	single	argument	of	an	
intransitive	clause.	
		
Finally, consider global DCM in Fore, in which multiple strategies are used to resolve 
ambiguity. Standardly, higher animates (humans > animates > inanimates) are interpreted as 
having higher roles (subject > indirect object > direct object; Scott 1978: 114–16). 
Differently from the previous language, linear order is decisive in case of a draw (subjects 
preceding direct objects). Only when the interpretative hierarchy or linear order needs to be 
overruled, ergative case -(wa)ma is used (cf. Donohue and Donohue 1997 for an alternative 
analysis). 
 
Fore (Trans-New Guinea, Papua New Guinea; Scott 1978: 115–16) 
 
(4)  a.  Yaga:-wama  wá   aegúye. 
pig-ERG  man  3.SG.OBJ.hit.3.SG.SU.IND 
‘The pig attacks the man.’ 
 
b.  Yaga:  wá  aegúye. 
pig  man 3.SG.OBJ.hit.3.SG.SU.IND 
‘The man kills the pig.’ 
 
Below, we will show how the different DCM systems can be seen as diachronic variants of 
the same underlying system, in which local DOM uses an extra constraint that is derived from 
a bidirectional optimization process. First, however, we will show how the above variation is 
generally dealt with in OT. 
 
8.3  The state of the art 
 
Differential case marking has been a prominent topic in Optimality-Theoretical approaches to 
grammar, initiated by the work of Aissen (2003). Proposed OT analyses have associated the 
two case-marking systems introduced above with their own type of optimization procedure. 
For local DCM, a unidirectional analysis has been proposed (e.g., Aissen 2003); for global 
DCM, a (semi-)bidirectional analysis has been argued to be necessary (e.g., de Swart 2007; cf. 
also de Hoop and Malchukov 2007, 2008). 
 
8.3.1 Unidirectional OT and local DCM 
 
Recall the examples of local DCM from Malayalam. For such variation, a simple 
unidirectional analysis seems to suffice. In unidirectional OT, the goal is to determine the 
best form for a meaning (OT syntax, e.g. Grimshaw 1997) or the best meaning for a form (OT 
semantics, Hendriks and de Hoop 2001). In such an approach, the optimization procedure for 
the production of (1a) ‘He bought a cow’ would look as in Tableau 8.1. This tableau 
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essentially presents the analysis of Aissen (2003), but with different names for the constraints 
involved.3  
 
PROD: buy(he, cow) ANIMO→MARKER ECON
 a. he cow buy *!  
→ b. he cow.ACC buy  *
 
Tableau 8.1 Unidirectional productive optimization procedure for buy(he, cow) in local DCM 
 
In this optimization procedure, a general economy constraint ECON(OMY) prefers unmarked 
form candidates above case-marked ones. Because this constraint is outranked by a constraint 
that requires animate objects to be case-marked, ANIMO→MARKER, the second candidate 
becomes optimal and accusative case is used in this situation.  
Obviously, form candidates for meaning inputs with inanimate objects will vacuously 
satisfy ANIMO→MARKER. In these cases, ECON can decide, as illustrated in Tableau 8.2. Thus, 
Malayalam will not use accusative case on coconuts.  
 
PROD: buy(he, cow) ANIMO→MARKER ECON
→ a. I coconut buy   
 b. I coconut.ACC buy  *!
 
Tableau 8.2 Unidirectional productive optimization procedure for buy(he, coconut) in local 
DCM 
 
Given the use of these forms, the optimization procedure from form to meaning also 
results in the right outcome. To this end we employ two constraints. The general constraint 
FAITHL which requires hearers to interpret everything the speaker has said (cf. Zeevat 2000; 
see also Zeevat and Jäger 2002) is violated by any interpretation in conflict with the provided 
morphosyntactic information, e.g., assignment of the subject function to an argument marked 
																																																								
3 A single-headed arrow “→” is used to indicate unidirectional optimality. Note further that we include 
harmonically bounded candidates in our tableaux, since the choice between case-marked and bare arguments is 
fundamental to our argument. 
		
with accusative case. The other semantic constraint is PROMINENCE (cf. de Hoop and Lamers 
2006; see also the BIAS constraint in Zeevat and Jäger 2002), that tells the hearer to interpret 
as the A that argument that is highest in animacy. This constraint is violated by 
interpretations in which O is higher in animacy than A. 
When applied to the form he cow-ACC buy marked with accusative case (which was 
found optimal in Tableau 8.1), we arrive at the right interpretation, as Tableau 8.3 shows. 
This is due to the fact that FAITHL requires the accusative case-marked argument to be 
assigned the O-function. Likewise, absence of accusative case will result in the right 
interpretation when the O-argument is coconut, because otherwise PROM will be violated; cf. 
Tableau 8.4. This interpretation would of course have also come out as optimal if accusative 
had been used on the object. This shows that use of case marking is indeed not necessary to 
express this meaning. 
INT: he cow.ACC buy FAITHL PROM
→ a. buy(he, cow)   
 b. buy(cow, he) *! *
 
Tableau 8.3 Unidirectional interpretive optimization procedure for he cow.ACC buy in local 
DCM 
 
INT: I coconut buy FAITHL PROM
→ a. buy(I, coconut)   
 b. buy(coconut, I)  *!
 
Tableau 8.4 Unidirectional interpretive optimization procedure for I coconut buy in local 
DCM 
 
8.3.2 Bidirectional OT and global DCM 
 
Global DCM was illustrated in the previous section with examples from Awtuw. Rather than 
assuming constraints that require the marking of only those objects that outrank their subjects 
in animacy, these systems seem to involve an additional interpretational check. The use of 
overt case marking is determined by taking into account the hearer’s perspective to see if the 
optimal candidate indeed leads to the intended result. Consequently, bidirectional OT 
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analyses have been proposed for these kinds of systems (de Swart 2007; de Hoop and 
Malchukov 2007, 2008). In bidirectional OT, syntax and semantics are dependent on one 
another, as the outcome of one direction of optimization constrains the outcome of the other 
direction (Blutner 2000; Blutner et al. 2006). Different models of bidirectional optimization 
have been proposed in recent years to account for a wide variety of phenomena (see Beaver 
and Lee 2004 and the contributions to Benz and Mattausch 2011 for discussion; see 
contributions to this volume by Hoek and de Hoop, de Swart, Legendre et al., and Hendriks 
for applications of weak bidirectional optimization). We will employ here an asymmetric 
version of bidirectional OT similar in spirit to earlier work (Smolensky 1998; Donohue 1999; 
Zeevat 2000; Wilson 2001; Jäger 2003). See de Swart (2011) for a discussion of the relation 
of this model with respect to other versions of bidirectional OT. We have used this model in 
earlier work to model (differential) case marking and word order phenomena (see de Swart 
2007, 2011; Lestrade 2010; van Bergen 2011). 
In this model the outcome of the production component is constrained by the 
interpretational component, but not (necessarily) vice versa. More specifically, a form f is 
bidirectionally optimal for a given meaning m iff the meaning m is uniquely recoverable from 
that form f and there is no form f′ which is less marked than f—i.e., a better form from the 
viewpoint of productive optimization, and from which m is uniquely recoverable. A meaning 
m is uniquely recoverable from a form f iff it is the unique optimal candidate in the 
interpretive optimization of f. Hence, a form which is optimal from the production 
perspective can be rejected as the output candidate when it results in the wrong interpretation, 
i.e., an interpretation different from the one intended. As a result, a candidate which is 
suboptimal from the production perspective can become bidirectionally optimal (given that it 
does express the intended meaning). 
Consider the optimization procedure for (2a) ‘The woman bit the pig’ in Tableau 8.5. 
We will make use of the constraints introduced in the previous section. 
 
PROD: bit(woman,pig) ECON FAITHL PROM
↔ a. woman pig bit    
 b. woman pig-OBJ bit *!   
INTa: woman pig bit ECON FAITHL PROM
→ i.  bit(woman, pig)    
 ii. bit(pig, woman)   *!
INTb: woman pig-OBJ bit ECON FAITHL PROM
→ i.  bit(woman, pig)    
		
 ii. bit(pig, woman)  *! *
 
Tableau 8.5 Bidirectional optimization procedure for bit(woman, pig) in global DCM 
 
First, at the production stage (PROD), the unmarked candidate is found optimal because of 
ECON. When considering the interpretation of this initially preferred candidate, 
PROM(INENCE) excludes the interpretation in which the pig acts on the woman (INTa). Since 
this leads to the desired result, the preferred form can be used indeed, which is indicated with 
the two-sided arrow ‘↔’ at the production stage (as INTb shows, the case-marked candidate 
would have led to the right interpretation too).  
Now contrast this with the bidirectional optimization procedure for (3a) ‘The pig bit 
the woman’ in Tableau 8.6, where an object marker is necessary. 
 
PROD: bit(pig, woman) ECON FAITHL PROM
→ a. woman pig bit    
↔ b. woman-OBJ pig bit *!   
INTa: woman pig bit ECON FAITHL PROM
→ i.  bit(woman, pig)    
 ii. bit(pig, woman)   *!
INTb: woman-OBJ pig bit ECON FAITHL PROM
 i.  bit(woman, pig)  *!  
→ ii. bit(pig, woman)   *
 
Tableau 8.6 Bidirectional optimization procedure for bit(pig, woman) in global DCM 
 
Again, the unmarked candidate is preferred for economy reasons, as is indicated with the 
simple arrow at the production stage. This time, however, this form does not lead to the 
correct interpretation, as its evaluation at INTa shows: PROM would lead to an interpretation 
in which the woman is the A. Production candidate b, which makes use of an object marker, 
does yield the intended interpretation that it was the pig that bit the woman (INTb). By 
FAITHL the correct interpretation is ensured. Thus, in order to be understood, the unmarked 
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candidate cannot be used but the speaker has to resort to a more explicit way of expression 
(again indicated by the two-sided arrow at PROD).  
In sum, we have shown how local DCM systems can be modeled using unidirectional 
optimization through the stipulation of a constraint such as ANIMO→MARKER that applies to 
a subset of arguments. Global DCM, by contrast, requires a bidirectional analysis with an 
additional interpretational check to ensure the optimal candidate leads to the intended 
meaning. 
We see two problems with the above state of affairs. First, a constraint such as 
ANIMO→MARKER seems rather ad hoc and should preferably be independently motivated.4 
Second, it is undesirable to propose completely different optimization procedures, 
unidirectional and bidirectional, for a very similar phenomenon in different languages. 
Preferably, there is one and the same system that only differs in the (ranking of its) 
constraints. Fortunately, both problems can be solved at once, as we will show in the 
following section. 
 
 
8.4  From bidirectional optimization to unidirectional constraints 
 
In this section we will show how domain-specific constraints need not be stipulated but can 
be functionally motivated as the result of a generalization over bidirectional optimization 
procedures in which only very general constraints are used initially. Although we believe that 
this claim holds true more generally (cf. Haspelmath 1999, Zeevat and Jäger 2002, and 
Jackendoff 2002 for similar ideas), we will restrict ourselves in this chapter to the application 
to case marking. 
We assume that the following general principles are universally present in the 
(human) mind. First, there is an economy principle, which is also known as the principle of 
least effort (cf. Zipf 1965). People will naturally choose the path of least resistance to arrive 
at some goal. This principle is generally accepted in the literature, and probably does not 
need much further introduction.  
Next, we have a desire for communicative success. This principle too should hardly 
need motivation. The goal of human communication is to transfer an idea to (the mind of) a 
receiver, and the only natural way to do so is via encoding that idea in a signal. If there was 
no desire for having the decoded signal come close to what was originally meant and encoded, 
there would not be any communication in the first place (cf. Pagin 2008 for a more 
sophisticated discussion). Indeed, it probably is not so much the desire for success when 
communicating that one may question about. Instead, the real question is whether language 
basically is for communication or to organize one’s thoughts for oneself. Even if one 
																																																								
4 Aissen (2003) derives a similar constraint on the basis of the process of harmonic alignment. This approach, 
however, stipulates the (universal) availability of prominence hierarchies and a (broad) set of associated 
constraints. 
		
assumed the latter (something we would disagree with), we could still say that whenever 
language is used for communication, people make sure that it works (given what we have just 
said). 
Finally, humans have a disposition to generalize. This disposition is humorously 
illustrated by the following quote from the RationalWiki entry of pattern recognition: “If one 
thinks one sees something coming at one’s head, it is better to duck and be wrong, than not 
duck and be wrong.”5 More serious motivations for the primacy of this principle that one may 
encounter are that “[categorization] is the basis for the construction of our knowledge of the 
world. It is the most basic phenomenon of cognition” (Cohen and Lefebvre 2005: 2), 
“survival and success in the world depend on making judgments that are as accurate as 
possible given the limited amount of information” (Krynski and Tenenbaum 2007: 430), or 
that generalization allows for the use of a maximum amount of information with minimal 
cognitive effort (Rosch 1978). 
For language, these principles can be illustrated by the fact that frequent words are 
short (cf. the principle of economy), the only way to develop a lexicon is by negotiating 
meaning (cf. the desire for communicative success), and without generalizations, there would 
not be words in the first place (cf. the disposition to generalize). 
Below, it will be shown how we can describe and derive the different types of case-
marking systems discussed in section 8.3, using only the just-mentioned general principles 
(an economy principle, a desire for communicative success, and a disposition to generalize). 
A local system can be shown to follow from a global system in which one and the same 
solution is used to resolve ambiguity (i.e., the Awtuw type). Although the origins and 
historical development of DCM systems in individual languages are often still unclear, some 
diachronic data can be shown to mirror our developmental sketch (see Morimoto and de 
Swart 2006 for a discussion of DOM in Spanish).6 
 
8.4.1 Simulating the development of a local DCM system 
 
Equipped with the three general principles just introduced, a learning hearer will observe in 
the input from their language environment that most animates by far are subjects (both 
intransitive (S) and transitive (A)), whereas most objects are inanimate (cf. Table 8.1; cf. 
Zeevat and Jäger (2002) and Øvrelid (2004) for concrete corpus counts underlying this 
abstraction).7 
																																																								
5 <http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Pattern_recognition>, consulted on June 14, 2013. 
6	There	is	also	evidence	for	a	development	from	a	global	to	a	local	function	of	other	types	of	argument	
marking,	including	direction	marking	(Zúñiga	2006:	248–9)	and	agent‐focus	marking	(Stiebels	2006).	
7 This assumes that a child can already distinguish animate from inanimate referents. Indeed, this distinction has 
been shown to emerge in early infancy (Gelman and Opfer 2002). 
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 S/A O 
animate very many few 
inanimate few many 
 
Table 8.1 Abstract crosstab for observed relation between animacy and function 
  
		
 
The most prominent generalization that follows from these data is that animate event 
participants are likely to be the subject (cf. Comrie’s 1989 notion of natural transitivity and 
the PROMINENCE constraint, which was used in the previous section too).  
When growing up in a DOM language environment in which there is a single strategy 
to resolve ambiguity, our learning hearer will next observe that if this marker is used, this is 
always done to mark objects (Table 8.2).8  
 
 S/A O 
Ø very many many 
marker - few 
 
Table 8.2 Abstract crosstab for the use of markers and function in a single-strategy DOM 
environment 
 
Given our DOM environment, this does not hold the other way around: because of the 
economy principle, Os remain unmarked whenever possible. 
Thus, our learning hearer is left with two generalizations, summarized in (5). 
 
(5)  a.  Generalization I: animate → S/A 
b.  Generalization II: marker → O 
 
Generally, language learners are not only listening to input, they will (try to) produce 
utterances themselves too. Doing so, they will wish to verbalize different types of events, 
predominantly intransitive events (with an S argument only), transitive events in which the A 
outranks the O in animacy (A > animacyO), and transitive events in which this is the other way 
around, the O being equal or higher in animacy (A ≤ animacyO). Because of the economy 
principle, learning speakers will prefer to leave arguments unmarked. When checking the 
communicative success of the expressions of their preference, they will observe that for 
situations in which there is only one animate argument which functions as the transitive 
subject, the correct interpretation will follow by Generalization I (animate→S/A). However, 
when there is more than one animate argument or when the single animate argument 
functions as the object, this generalization does not lead to the right interpretation. For 
																																																								
8 In this and the following tables, the hyphen is used to indicate that the relevant (object) marker is never used to 
mark subjects or agents. This does not exclude the possibility of using other markers in passive-like 
constructions. 
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communication of such situations, something extra needs to be done. Fortunately, the 
solution is provided by Generalization II (marker→O): If an additional object marker is used, 
the correct interpretation should follow. 
As the reader may have noticed, this is nothing but the prose version of the 
bidirectional optimization process that describes global DCM discussed around Tableau 8.6: 
in case of ambiguity, the object needs to be marked; otherwise, the arguments can be left 
unmarked.   
The optimization process by a learning speaker just described can easily be simulated 
by a computer. We can let a computer algorithm randomly produce sentences, check the 
expected communicative success for each utterance using Generalization I, use an O marker 
in cases of failure (Generalization II), and, most importantly, have it track the use of object 
marking throughout a series of optimization procedures. This last step is crucial for our 
argument: on the basis of the evolving record of optimization procedures that thus emerges, 
new generalizations are made that can be used as constraints in later optimization processes. 
It will be shown that the constraint ANIMO→MARKER that was used in the analysis of local 
DCM system, can be seen as such a generalization.  
In the production of sentences, our computer algorithm will first randomly provide 
situations to be described following the assumed distribution of interest in (6). Although 
purely hypothetical, these numbers are inspired by work of Comrie (1989) and corpus 
research of Zeevat and Jäger (2002) and Øvrelid (2004) (cf. also the contributions in de Swart 
et al. 2008). The underlying assumption here is that people are mostly interested in other 
people and their interactions, and it is mostly animates that cause the action in the world, 
inanimates being acted upon. 
 
(6)  a.  p(Subject=Anim)=.2     (e.g., John walks.) 
b.  p(Subject=Inan)=.1     (The statue stands.) 
c. p(Subject=Anim&Object=Anim)=.2  (John sees Pete.) 
d.  p(Subject=Anim&Object=Inanim)=.4  (John sees the statue.) 
e.  p(Subject=Inanim&Object=Anim)=.05  (The statue pleases John.) 
f.  p(Subject=Inanim&Object=Inanim)=.05  (The statue resembles a car.) 
 
That is, we assume that people talk about simple properties of animates in approximately 20 
percent of their utterances, and about simple properties of inanimates in 10 percent of their 
utterances, animates are said to act on other animates in 20 percent of the utterances, etc. The 
exact numbers are of minor importance; it is mostly the relative proportions that matter. 
Specifically, animates are mostly subjects. 
 By default, the most economical way of expression is tried, as this is preferred by 
ECONOMY. That is, at this stage of the production, and at this point in the development of the 
grammar, the algorithm initially generates an unmarked form candidate for each meaning 
input.  
		
In the next step, the expected communicative success of the utterance is determined.9 
There are two ways of doing this, both of which lead to the same results. The simpler version 
would be to assume communicative success with an unmarked expression whenever the A 
argument outranks the O in animacy, and only to use a marker when this is not the case (the 
O argument outranking the A, or both arguments being equal in animacy). Given the assumed 
world in (6), this would mean that a marker is necessary in 30 percent of the utterances, in 
which an animate O is involved in 5/6 of the cases. This simple version, however, ignores 
lexical specifications that one may argue play a role. For example, the verb to see requires an 
animate A, the verb to please an animate O.  
To preempt possible concerns about lexical specifications of the verb involved, the 
figures below are based on a more complex version taking lexical specifications of the verb 
into account. Generalization I still applies and could be seen as summarizing the difference in 
type frequency of the different subcategorization preferences of verbs. This time, however, 
we do not assume that all unmarked sentences with animate As will be understood correctly, 
nor that all unmarked sentences with inanimate Os will. First, if there is only one argument, 
this necessarily is the subject and therefore success is guaranteed (this holds both for the 
simple and the complex version). But now, even if the two arguments are equal in animacy, a 
marker may not always be necessary to disambiguate. For example, if a man and a cow are 
involved in a buying event (cf. (1a)), we can predict on the basis of what we know about 
buying that it is probably the cow that is bought. Also, whereas the role assignment still 
mostly follows from Generalization I if the A argument outranks the O in animacy, this does 
not hold when the verb is specified for the opposite animacy-role distribution. That is, lexical 
specification but not Generalization I requires a marker in cases in which it is for some reason 
really meant that a cow buys someone or that John pleases the statue. These situations can be 
expected to be very rare, but we will assume a rather large proportion of 1 percent of the 
cases nevertheless to show the robustness of the simulation. The more important difference 
with the simple simulation, however, is that in most unmarked sentences in which an 
inanimate A and an animate O are intended we will assume that this is interpreted correctly 
because of the lexical specification of the verb (again, cf. to please). Specifically, we will 
assume that only in 40 percent of the sentences with an animate O and an inanimate A an 
object marker is deemed necessary to ensure the correct interpretation. Similarly, we assume 
that in 5 percent of the cases in which two animate arguments figure, verbal lexical 
specification can still tell them apart. 
Table 8.3 summarizes these revised assumptions (the proportions in the second 
column follow from (6)). 
 
Sentence type Proportion of Success?
																																																								
9 Note that we thus implement the desire for communicative success as a bidirectional check for correct 
interpretation; cf. Levelt (1989) for a comparable claim. 
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 utterances yes no
Single argument .3 1 0
A >animacy O .4 .99 .01
A <animacy O .05 .6 .4
animate A&O .2 .05 .95
inanimate A&O .05 0 1
 
Table 8.3 Communicative success of unmarked expressions combining Generalization I and 
verbal lexical specification for different types of sentence types 
 
As said above, in those cases in which communicative success is not achieved with an 
unmarked sentence, the algorithm will try again using an object marker (cf. Generalization II 
in (5)). As a result, all situations eventually will be successfully “communicated.” 
 
TYPE ARGUMENT(S) ROLES 
CLEAR? 
USE 
MARKER? 
LOG ODDS OBJECT MARKER 
overall AnimO InanimO
intrans S=anim yes no 0.00 0.00 0.00
intrans S=anim yes no 0.00 0.00	 0.00
trans S=anim; O=inanim yes no -0.69 0.00 −0.69
trans S=anim; O=anim no yes 0.00 0.69 −0.69
trans S=anim; O=anim no yes 0.41 1.10	 −0.69
intrans S=inanim yes no 0.41 1.10	 −0.69
trans  S=inanim; O=inanim no yes 0.69 1.10	 0.00
intrans S=anim yes no 0.69 1.10	 0.00
trans S=anim; O=inanim yes no 0.29 1.10	 −0.41
trans S=inanim; O=inanim no yes 0.51 1.10 0.00
 
Table 8.4 First ten rows of randomly produced output of computer simulation of DOM 
system 
		
 
Table 8.4 should make the simulation process more concrete. The utterances are 
generated by the algorithm row by row. The input for the production, given in the first two 
columns, is a random draw from the world specified in (6). Next, the algorithm checks if the 
roles of the two arguments can be expected to be understood correctly. If they are, an 
unmarked form is used; if the roles are unclear, they are specified by an object marker. 
Finally, as the last block of columns shows, the developing log odds that an object marker is 
used are tracked for transitive clauses. In order to have the log odds start with zero, prior to 
the simulation a “history” is assumed of one unmarked and one marked utterance. As only 
transitive utterances are taken into consideration, the log odds change only after the third 
utterance in which no marker is used, as a result of which the overall score becomes log(1/2) 
(i.e., one marked utterance vs two unmarked utterances) = −.69. As this utterance involves an 
inanimate object, the log odds that an object marker is used for inanimate objects change 
accordingly. 
If we now generalize over many more optimization procedures (cf. our disposition to 
generalize), keeping track of the type of arguments that require a marker, the pattern 
illustrated in Figure 8.1 emerges.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 8.1 HERE] 
 
In this plot, the developing log odds of five series of 1000 optimization procedures are 
plotted, distinguishing between the overall odds that a marker is used (dark-grey circle), the 
odds that a marker is used for an animate object (light-grey triangle), and the odds that a 
marker is used on an inanimate object (black cross; corresponding to the last three columns of 
Table 8.4). As is clear, the five series yield very comparable outcomes, suggesting that our 
findings are reliable. Also, it can be seen that the overall log odds and the odds that a marker 
is used for an inanimate object quickly stabilize. Overall, the log odds that a marker is used 
settle just below zero. Undoing the logarithmic transformation, this means that these odds are 
slightly lower than one to one. The odds that a marker is used for animate objects increase 
quickly and stabilize around two on a logarithmic scale, meaning that a marker is necessary 
for roughly seven out of eight animate objects.  
This pattern can easily be understood. Both animate and inanimate objects sometimes 
are in need of an object marker. Because of verbal lexical specification, this is mostly the 
case when the arguments are equal in animacy (if they’re not, the verb is likely to tell who 
does what). As we talk much more often about animates than about inanimates interacting, an 
object marker on inanimates is hardly ever necessary. Instead, animate objects much more 
often cause ambiguity and therefore animate objects will often need marking. 
The crucial point of Figure 8.1 is that a third generalization presents itself very 
clearly: animate objects need object marking. When we formulate this third generalization 
into a constraint, we have functionally derived ANIMO→MARKER, which was stipulated in the 
analysis of local DCM above.  
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8.4.2 Simulating the maintenance of a global DCM system 
 
For the development of a unidirectional constraint, it is crucial that there is a convention of 
using one and the same resolution strategy in cases of communicative failure, i.e., the object 
marker. Only then, the odds for the use of the marker given a certain type of input can 
increase to such an extent that a generalization about their relation is possible. As we saw in 
section 8.2, some languages combine different strategies to achieve communicative success. 
For example, Fore can use both word order and case marking as cues to tell apart A from O; 
cf. example (4). In this section, we will show that unidirectional constraints are unlikely to 
develop from such systems.  
Much of the discussion in the previous section remains the same. We do not expect 
situations being talked about to differ between languages, so we will take the relative 
frequencies of the assumed world in (6) as a starting point for this simulation. What will 
differ, however, are the proportions of expected success of unmarked expressions. Note that 
we use unmarked here to refer to expressions in which no object marker is used, irrespective 
of word order. Consider Table 8.5. The crucial difference between this table and Table 8.3 in 
the previous version is that we now assume word order to disambiguate between arguments 
of equal animacy half of the time (cf. the fourth and fifth row). As discussed in section 8.2, 
sometimes markers are still necessary—for example, when word order is used to serve a 
different function, e.g. for information-structure purposes. (In fact, “Success?” may not be the 
best column label here, but we maintain it for ease of comparison with Table 8.3.) 
 
Sentence type Proportion of Success?
 utterances yes no
Single argument .3 1 0
A >animacy O .4 .99 .01
A <animacy O .05 .6 .4
animate A&O .2 .5 .5
inanimate A&O .05 .5 .5
 
Table 8.5 Communicative success of unmarked expressions combining Generalization I and 
verbal lexical specification, and word order for different types of sentence types 
 
If we now again run a simulation making use of these numbers, a very different 
pattern emerges, as shown in Figure 8.2. Differently from the previous simulation, the log 
odds for a marker for animate objects now linger around zero. From such a state of affairs, 
there is no generalization presenting itself: a constraint that directly assigns an object marker 
		
to animate objects will never emerge. This shows that our algorithm can model both local and 
global DCM systems.  
 
[INSERT FIGURE 8.2 HERE] 
 
 
8.5  Implications for the optimization process 
 
Thus far, we have shown how domain-specific constraints need not be postulated but can be 
derived from a generalization about bidirectional optimization processes. Obviously, this is 
highly desirable for reasons of parsimony and cognitive plausibility. As we will show now, 
there is another important gain. By adding this constraint to our grammar, we can speed up 
the bidirectional optimization process as we no longer first have to consider an inadequate 
candidate. In the tableaux below, we will show this gain by going step-by-step through the 
semi-bidirectional optimization procedure before and after the derivation of the constraint 
ANIMO→MARKER, forcing the use of the object marker on animate Os.  
Consider the following example from Malayalam, a language with a local DCM 
system (cf. section 8.2). 
 
(7)  Avan  kuʈʈiy-e  aʈiccu. 
he child-ACC beat.PAST 
‘He beat the child.’ 
 
First, we will assume the state of affairs before a unidirectional constraint is 
developed. The PROM constraint of the original unidirectional proposal (section 8.3.1) is 
substituted with GEN(ERALIZE), which can be seen as the constraint version of our assumed 
generalization principle and here tells the hearer to use the default distribution of roles in the 
interpretation of specific utterances. Note that we have retained the use of FAITHL, which can 
now be understood as the constraint implementation of the hearer’s version of the need for 
communicative success: in order to understand each other, one should be faithful to the 
conventions in the language that say, for example, that chairs denote ‘chairs’ and object 
markers mark objects.  
First, an unmarked form is produced (PROD) and checked for its interpretation (INTa, 
Tableau 8.7). Since both arguments are animate, GEN cannot decide between them, and since 
no marking is used, neither can FAITHL. 
 
PROD: beat(he, child) ECON FAITHL GEN
→ a. he child beat    
 b. he child-OBJ beat *   
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INTa: he child beat ECON FAITHL GEN
→ i.  beat(he, child)    
→ ii. beat(child, he)    
 
Tableau 8.7 Check 1 (before generalization) 
 
As the unmarked form will not lead to success, an object marker is tried next. Since the 
use of an object marker to mark the object is generally accepted, FAITHL will now penalize 
any interpretation other than one in which the object-marked argument is the object. As a 
result, the correct interpretation is obtained (Tableau 8.8). 
 
PROD: beat(he, child) ECON FAITHL GEN
→ a. he child beat    
↔ b. he child-OBJ beat *   
INTa: he child beat ECON FAITHL GEN
→ i.  beat(he, child)    
→ ii. beat(child, he)    
INTb: he child-OBJ beat ECON FAITHL GEN
→ i.  beat(he, child)    
 ii. beat(child , he)  *  
 
Tableau 8.8 Check 2 (before generalization)  
 
As argued above, after many of such bidirectional optimization processes, the 
generalization will be made that animate objects need marking, leading to a constraint 
ANIMO→MARKER. As we will show now, the development of this constraint will save one 
bidirectional check, as the optimal candidate from the production perspective will directly 
lead to the right interpretation. In Tableau 8.9, the derived constraint has been included in the 
grammar. As can be seen, it decides for a marked form candidate directly at PROD, a 
		
candidate that will indeed lead to the correct interpretation. Differently from the previous 
state of affairs, we only need one bidirectional check to confirm communicative success. 
 
PROD: beat(he, child) ANIMO→ MARKER ECON FAITHL GEN 
 a. he child beat *    
↔ b. he child-OBJ beat  *   
INTa: he child beat  ECON FAITHL GEN 
→ i.  beat(he, child)     
 ii. beat(child, he)   *  
 
Tableau 8.9 Gain (after generalization)  
 
There is a drawback to this generalization, albeit a minor one. Once a constraint is 
developed that requires the marking of all animate objects, this object marker will also be 
used in situations in which it is not needed for disambiguation (cf. Durie 1995). Consider the 
following example from Malayalam. 
 
(8)  Avan  oru  paʃuvin-e  vaɲɲi. 
he  a  cow-ACC  buy.PAST 
‘He bought a cow.’ 
 
Obviously, the hearer will know who is buying whom if a man and a cow are involved, also 
in the absence of an object marker. Indeed, GEN penalizes interpretations that go against the 
default, as illustrated in Tableau 8.10. Nevertheless, the marker is obligatory because of 
ANIMO→MARKER. This is the price that has to be paid for the use of a specialized constraint. 
It can be hypothesized that the costs of this overgeneralization (i.e., the incidental 
unnecessary use of an object marker) are more than compensated for by the savings from not 
having to find out for most situations that an economical utterance will not do, and to develop 
a new attempt subsequently.10 In sum, generalization leads to accidental redundancy, which is 
inherent to local DCM systems. 
PROD: buy(he, cow) ANIMO→ MARKER ECON FAITHL GEN 
																																																								
10 Given the SOV nature of the language, use of the object marker may also be helpful in resolving potential 
online ambiguity during sentence processing. 
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 a. he cow buy *    
↔ b. he cow-OBJ buy  *   
INTb: he cow-OBJ buy  ECON FAITHL GEN 
→ i.  buy(he, cow)     
 ii. buy(cow, he)   * *
INTa: he cow buy  ECON FAITHL GEN 
→ i.  buy(he, cow)     
 ii. buy(cow, he)    *
 
Tableau 8.10 Overgeneralization of object marker in local DCM 
 
Differently from the traditional approach to local DCM, we have proposed a semi-
bidirectional analysis. Apart from the benefit of the overall parsimony, there is a crucial 
observation that suggests that this local system is indeed still bidirectional. Recall that in 
Malayalam all and only animate objects are obligatorily marked. Inanimate ambiguity, 
however, is also solved with an object marker, as illustrated in the following example:  
 
(9)  a.  Kappal tiramaalakaɭ-e  bheediccu. 
ship  waves-ACC   split.PAST 
‘The ship broke the waves.’ 
b.  Tiramaalakaɭ kappal-ine  bheediccu. 
waves   ship-ACC  split.PAST 
‘The waves broke the ship.’ 
 
Obviously, our constraint ANIMO→MARKER does not apply here and the object marker has to 
be motivated in a different way. We propose that it follows from the bidirectional reasoning 
that we have used throughout our analysis. The development of unidirectional constraints 
does not turn a bidirectional system into a unidirectional one; it only ensures that the first 
candidate that is checked will be found bidirectionally optimal. 
 
8.6  Discussion  
 
		
In this chapter we have shown how a unidirectional constraint can be derived from a 
generalization over multiple bidirectional optimization processes. We have suggested that our 
analysis, although applied to DOM here, should hold more generally. Indeed, nothing in our 
algorithm is specific to object marking. The abstract idea simply is that the odds for a certain 
output given a certain input increase to such to an extent that a generalization about their 
relation presents itself. In the process of tracking these optimization procedures (cf. Figure 
8.1) at some point the learner will generalize over their outcomes and establish a constraint 
that directly links input and output. As the reader will have noticed, we have not specified at 
which point exactly this generalization is made or expected. Although the establishment of 
such a link sounds very plausible to us, we know too little about the brain to pinpoint the 
number of optimizations or the odds for a marker that are necessary for this. Comparable 
questions have been studied experimentally, however, and may give at least an abstract 
answer. Peterson and Beach (1967: 37–8) discuss the optional stopping paradigm, in which 
“[a]fter each datum the subjects has the option of continuing the sample or of stopping and 
making his inference.” The conclusion drawn from multiple studies using this paradigm is 
that subjects keep sampling data as long as the costs of a new datum are less than the 
expected increase in payoff from the information it will provide. 
In the simulation presented above, we assumed that the language learner starts out 
with a grammar that is bidirectionally specified. Although this is perhaps not the standard 
assumption in the OT literature on child language acquisition (see Hendriks, this volume, for 
a discussion), we believe it can be reconciled with existing proposals. The distinction 
between unidirectional and bidirectional grammars in language acquisition figures most 
prominently in discussions of asymmetries between language production and comprehension, 
be it when production lags behind comprehension (Smolensky 1996) or vice versa (Hendriks 
and Spenader 2005/6; de Hoop and Krämer 2005/6). Smolensky (1996) proposes that 
children use constraints bidirectionally. Both in production and comprehension the same 
constraints are used in the same ranking. Our proposal comes very close to this (cf. Tableau 
9) with the difference that we do not assume a given set of domain-specific constraints. (But 
cf. Hendriks and Spenader 2005/6—see also de Hoop and Krämer 2005/6—who propose that 
children start out with a unidirectional grammar and only at a later stage develop a 
bidirectional grammar in which they optimize over pairs of form and meaning.)  
 
8.7  Conclusion  
 
In this chapter, we simulated the development of differential case-marking systems, showing 
that unidirectional constraints can be derived from a generalization over bidirectional 
optimization processes. Our findings bear on two discussions in the OT literature. First, they 
suggest that not all constraints need to be innate. Domain-specific constraints can be derived 
from optimization procedures in which initially only very general constraints are used. 
Second, it was shown that different case-marking systems could be explained using the same 
bidirectional architecture. With the development of specific unidirectional constraints, the 
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bidirectionally optimal candidate is produced right away more often, because of which costly 
ad hoc repair strategies are less often necessary.  
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